This paper investigates the long-run performance of initial public offerings of 174 family firms floated in Germany between 1977 and 1998. Family businesses typically come closest to the ideal of nonseparation of ownership from control. The fundamental change in ownership structure induced by the flotation represents a change in the governance of the firm as for the first time dispersed outsiders buy equity capital. An examination of the stock price performance allows drawing conclusions to explain the impact of governance changes on firm value. A prediction of stock price performance spans two theories: Advantages of modern corporations where management and ownership are separated are cut short by the so-called principal-agent problem. Managers -the agents -could take actions against the interest of shareholders -the principals. Agency problems in closely-held family firms should be less predominant. On the other hand, the rent-protection theory predicts that family owners have incentives to skim private benefits at the expense of firm performance. Depending on the extent of these two effects, family-owned firms should out-, respectively underperform the market. The empirical evidence seems to support the private benefit hypothesis: 3 years after the listing the marketadjusted return was on average -25.31% compared to a broad index. The underperformance increased to -53.50% after 60 months. Even when excluding potential new economy and Neuer Markt biases, the underperformance is a statistically significant -10.50% and -50.13%, respectively.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the stock price performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) of family-owned firms in Germany floated between 1977 and 1998. The decision to go public and the timing are an important event in the life cycle of any company. During recent decades an increasing number of companies chose this instrument to raise new equity capital. As 395 German companies went public during the period of 1977 to 1998, the majority of these IPOs took place during the last 8 years, i.e. 1991 to 1998. The majority of IPO firms that went public during the period analyzed in this paper can be characterized as familyowned. In addition, e.g. Schuermann and Koerfgen (1997) expect a number of some 5,000 German family-owned companies suitable for a stock market listing. Despite the recent decline at international stock markets an increasing number of IPOs of family-owned firms can be anticipated in the future.
Numerous papers examine the performance of IPOs. Academic research is mostly driven by the persistent existence of two ostensible anomalies: underpricing and underperformance.
As there is strong empirical evidence that, on average, IPOs are underpriced in almost any capital market, the evidence for an abnormal long-run performance is less definite. In the past a majority of studies documented a long-run underperformance compared to some type of benchmark. Questions concerning the adequacy of methodical issues have been raised more recently. The motivation to analyze the performance of family-owned firms is twofold: (i) Family-owned firms are a peripheral issue in the academic literature, especially in the field of financial economics. This is contrary to their economic and social importance, especially in the German economy. 6 A very few 6 Family firms make up 40% of the Fortune 500 companies in the United States, generate some 66% of the German gross domestic product and employ about 50% of the labor force in the United Kingdom; see Chami (2001) , p. 1. For a similar argumentation see e.g. Davis (1983) studies, e.g. Aussenegg (1997) , examining the performance of IPOs identify and separate familyowned firms in a subsection. This paper focuses explicitly on family-owned firms.
(ii) Family-owned firms are a very interesting object to examine due to their specific governance structures per se: Privatelyheld family businesses and public corporations represent two opposite extremes of the relation between ownership and control as family-owned firms come closest to the ideal of non-separation of ownership and control. The IPO of a family-owned firm can be interpreted as a first and crucial step in its evolution into a public corporation where ownership and control are separated. Thus, the fundamental change in ownership structure induced by the IPO represents a change in the governance of the family firm, as for the first time dispersed outsiders invest in the company's equity capital. The analysis of family firm post-IPO performance allows drawing conclusions, which influence changes in the governance structure of family-owned firms have on firm value. The German economy can be characterized by a predominant family ownership as a form of business organization. Ownership is often concentrated in a small and closely related group of individuals. Starting with Berle and Means (1932) a new form of business organization emerged in the academic literature also referred to as the contractual view of the firm: Ownership and active management are separated. These corporations are owned by dispersed outside shareholders. These firms face several advantages, e.g. on capital and labour markets. It seems conceivable to hypothesize that modern corporations should perform better than traditional closely held companies. But this hypothesis is moderated by a phenomenon called the principalagent conflict: Professional managers -the agentscould take actions against the best interest of the shareholders -the principals. The conclusion is that agents have to be monitored, which is cost intensive. On the other hand, family firms face a different problem: Family owners have incentives to skim private benefits at the expense of firm performance. Minority shareholders are likely to be expropriated. Deviations from the market-based investment decision rule do not only weaken, but may use up the benefits illustrated in view of the agency theory. As a consequence, investors should undervalue family firms. The analysis of the above mentioned two stylized facts -underpricing and underperformanceis an important part in the research area of event studies. In general, event studies test how stock prices respond to information in order to derive testimony with regard to the efficient market hypothesis. Fama (1970) defines an efficient financial market as one in which security prices always fully reflect all available information. In regard of IPOs Dawson (1987) states:
European countries (Germany). 44 .29% (64.62%) are family-controlled.
If there are enough astute traders in the market, then it will quickly price new shares to reflect the available set of information. Significant long-run abnormal returns could be interpreted as inconsistent with market efficiency. If the efficient market hypothesis proves true, neutral performance relative to an appropriate benchmark should be observed. A serious objection can be formulated: Tests in regard of market efficiency require a normative model as a benchmark. If a positive, i.e. empirically based, 'model is used, one is not testing market efficiency' but compares one empirical pattern to another empirical pattern, as formulated by Loughran and Ritter (2002) . Due to the specific character of IPOs -as there is no trading history, data cannot properly be adjusted for riskempirical results have to be interpreted with caution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the market for IPOs in Germany. The key findings of how ownership structure affects firm value and specifics of familyowned firms are discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes the sample data and discusses the methodology. Chapter 5 comprehensively surveys the empirical literature on the long-run performance of IPO firms and presents and discusses the empirical findings. Several theoretical explanations are introduced and tested regression analyses. Chapter 6 concludes.
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The Market for Initial Public Offerings 2.1 Reasons for Going Public
As motives for family businesses to go public may differ from other groups of IPO firms, e.g. spin offs or privatizations, this section focuses on the first group. According to Rydqvist and Hoegholm (1995) , motives can be classified as financial or productivity related. Both groups can be further divided into firm and owner-based motives, respectively incentive and publicity-based motives. Table 1 describes the classification.
Financial aspects seem to be important in almost every IPO: Companies go public to raise new equity capital to finance their growth and to invest in new projects. In an empirical study of 127 family firm IPOs in Sweden, Rydqvist and Hoegholm (1995) find out that financial reasons are stated by 97% of the firms. Financial reasons seem to be crucial in Germany, too, as predominantly companies associated with the German Mittelstand show decreasing equity ratios during the last decades. 7 See e.g. Claussen (1991) , p. 183-184, or Zacharias (2000), p. 50-52, describing the equity gap. The results of an examination of all IPOs in 1985 in Germany show that the equity ratio increased from 27% before the IPO to 40% after the IPO; see Ladwig and Motte (1996) , p. 801. Especially in the case of family-owned firms it could be assumed that the most important benefit from going public is to overcome borrowing constraints instead of financing growth. -Performance evaluation, management is subjected to external control, outside monitoring -Facilitate future reissuance of equity and debt titles -Lower the cost of equity finance and increase its availability -Lower the cost of debt finance and decrease dependence from debt finance -Improve credit rating, reduce debt/equity ratio -Facilitate external growth through acquisitions, own shares as 'transaction currency' -Ability for the founder and other initial investors, -Products are better known, increased visibility e.g. private equity investors, to realize parts of -Raising the firm's attractiveness as an employer their investment to finance consumption or to -Increase employee status diversify private portfolios -Increase bargaining power versus suppliers -Facilitate succession of control -Expanded and reinforced social network Other financial motives, in general, include the availability of financing takeovers with shares and the overall improvement of financing conditions. Pagano et al. (1998) argue that, due to the improved publicity, financing conditions in general improve. Companies face a reduction in the cost of bank credits after the IPO. Firms borrow from a larger number of banks and increase their independence. The second group, portfolio rebalancing motives, refers to the financial situation of the initial investors. Depending on the ratio of selling old shares and new shares from a capital increase, the IPO provides liquidity for the firm's incumbent owners. With regard to familyowned firms the motive 'succession of control' is prominent. A large number of family companies face a problem of succession, i.e. the transition from the post-war generation that founded or professionalized the firms to the generation of heirs, the so-called Erbengeneration. 8 Via an IPO a company can be sold to outside investors. A second possibility is the valuation aspect of a stock market quotation. Although German jurisdiction denies this motive, a stock quotation can help to sell shares held within the complex structures of large families on the basis of a more or less 'objective' market price.
In Rydqvist and Hoegholm's study productivity motives are stated with a frequency of about 73%. Some companies link their bonus salaries to stock price performance or introduce stock option programs after the IPO. More important seems to be the aspect 8 Klein (2000) , p. 92-99, comprehensively describes the process of succession in family businesses.
of an increasing publicity on the markets for output and input factors, e.g. the market for human resources. Managers assume that the company's attractiveness increases. Employing several case studies and an empirical study, Ravasi and Marchisio (2001) find out that IPOs of family-owned firms have a much greater impact on the firm's strategic decisions than just the financial benefits: IPO firms also increase their social and reputational capital. Contrary to the above mentioned benefits of a stock market quotation, several disadvantages are associated with the IPO of a family-owned firm mostly due to the dilution of the shareholder structure: Family owners fear to lose their dominant positions within the firm. Many mature family-owned companies do not want to go public. Many families are not pleased with the idea that the firm's objective is reduced to maximizing the annual profit. Some family firms do not agree with the short-sighted perspective of capital markets and its effects on the company's strategic decisions and its development. Klein (2000) states that these family firms do not view the IPO as a form of financing but as the notional end as a family business. There seems to be a ubiquitous opinion that family owners view external financing as a sign of weakness. 9 Other, more common disadvantages include increasing management efforts, higher tax burdens, more restrictive publicity requirements and possibly consequences from the co-determination by employees. 10 
Theoretical Aspects of Going Public
From the family's perspective the IPO is an even more attractive way of raising new capital in case of an ownership structure that allows them to secure their controlling position within the company. Empirical studies examining IPOs in Germany confirm that family owners wish to keep their dominant position after the IPO, unless the primary motive for going public was to sell all their shares and retreat from the company. Ehrhardt and Nowak (2002a) find out that in their sample of 105 IPOs of family-owned firms even 5 years after the IPO more than 50% of the voting rights are owned by family investors. Several theoretical models analyze changes in the ownership structure after going public: Pagano (1993) examines how the decisions of entrepreneurs affect the economy. In his trade-off model the entrepreneur only goes public if the benefits of going public, e.g. the initial owner can diversify his own portfolio, outweigh the costs of going public, i.e. if the company faces a situation of financial distress. As a result some economies with smaller stock markets compared to the United States, e.g. Germany or Italy, have an inefficiently small number of companies listed on the stock exchanges in comparison to the stage of their economic development. Consequently, these markets can get trapped in such a low-level 'bad equilibrium'. Entrepreneurs do not go public in such an economy due to the failure to internalize the positive externality arising from the increase in the diversification opportunities that are available to outside investors due to the entrepreneurs' decisions to go public.
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In Zingales (1995) the decision (i) whether to go public and (ii) about what equity fraction initial investors will retain is the result of a value maximizing decision made by the initial owner who wants to eventually sell his company. The model assumes perfect information, but requires that the seller has better bargaining power against passive investors than against an investor who seeks control. By going public, the initial owner can change the proportion of cash flow rights and control rights which he will retain when he bargains with a potential buyer. To the extent that the market for corporate control is not perfectly competitive, but the market for shares is, the proportion of cash flow and control rights will affect the total amount of surplus he can extract from a potential buyer of the company. In order to maximize his total proceeds and to optimize the ownership structure, the initial owner must balance out two factors:
-By selling to dispersed shareholders, he maximizes his proceeds from the sale of cash flow rights.
-By directly bargaining with a potential buyer, he maximizes his proceeds from the sale of control rights.
A similar decision is modeled by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) . The authors analyze at what stage in its life cycle a firm should go public. The entrepreneur raising equity capital has to choose between placing shares privately with a small number of (institutional) investors or by selling shares to a dispersed public via an IPO. Chemmanur and Fulghieri focus on asymmetric information between the entrepreneur and outside investors. Their model predicts that younger firms seek financing by venture capitalists and older firms raise equity capital via an IPO.
Both, the question whether a company undertakes an IPO or stays private and the question of inside ownership fraction held by initial owners, depend on the optimal combination of majority control and dispersed ownership. Due to their different characteristics -cash flow rights are enjoyed by all shareholders, control rights are enjoyed only by the controlling shareholder -the initial owner should sell his company by two separate mechanisms: Cash flow rights should be auctioned to dispersed shareholders. Control rights should be sold in a direct negotiation. Legal restrictions can occur if the law restricts the stripping of cash flow rights from voting rights. The initial owner uses the IPO only as one step to achieve the ownership structure that will maximize his total proceeds from the sale. Mello and Parsons (1998) develop a model for the optimal IPO strategy: They view the IPO as a part of a staged process of financing that begins with an IPO for small, passive and dispersed investors, then the sale of a controlling block and, finally, the contingent sale of additional shares. In addition, they confirm that an immediate exit strategy for initial owners is not optimal. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) expect a high incidence of control transfers after the listing. Their hypothesis is confirmed by some empirical studies: In Rydqvist and Hoegholm (1995) the average ownership retention of family members is reduced to only 36% within 5 years, while family members still hold 48% of voting rights. In Pagano et al. the controlling group still holds 64.4% of voting rights 3 years after the IPO. In addition, Pagano et al. compare control turnover after an IPO with the normal turnover of control among privately held firms and find out that the former is twice as large as the latter. Contrary to that, the fraction retained by the controlling shareholder in the United States and in the United Kingdom is much smaller. 12 In Germany the average ownership retention of family shareholders stays remarkably high. For a sample of 105 family firm IPOs floated between 1970 and 1991 Ehrhardt and Nowak (2002a) find out that family shareholders hold 98.2% of the voting rights before the IPO, 77.1% immediately after the IPO, 67.9% after 3 years, 57.9% after 5 years and still 40.4% after 10 years. Even more notable, when using dual class share structures family shareholders still hold 51.8% of the voting rights 10 years after the IPO, whereas in non-dual class share structures family shareholders sell a high fraction of voting rights via the IPO and hold only 31.7% after 10 years.
Another hypothesis analyzing the portfolio diversifaction motive is: 'If diversification is an important motive in the decision to go public […] we should expect riskier companies to be more likely to go public, and controlling shareholders to sell a large portion of their shares at the time of the IPO or soon afterwards.' 13 Contrary to the hypothesis, the above described empirical findings provide evidence that the diversification motive is less important in the decision to go public. Family owners sell a substantial stake at the IPO, but retain more than a majority stake. These findings are in line with Mello and Parson's (1998) hypothesis that an IPO 'is not a good method for selling control'. Accordant with Zingales (1995) , Mello and Parsons (1998) argue that the IPO is the first stage in the eventual sale of a company. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) also focus on favoring large investors. As they abstract from asymmetric information, their optimal IPO method is the opposite. Their model suggests a block trade to a large investor first and after that selling shares to small investors at the same price. The empirical evidence, especially in Germany, does not seem to support this sequence.
Family Firms, Ownership and Performance

Separation of Ownership and Control
A main subject in the principal-agent literature is the separation of ownership from control rights. Berle and Means (1932) were among the first to document that the interest of directors and managers can diverge from those of the owners of a firm. Whereas the first try to maximize their own utility and pursue their own interest, the latter wish to maximize shareholder wealth. Wealth losses occur as a consequence. Berle and Means state that those who control the firm 'can serve their own pockets better by profiting at the expense of the company than by making profits for it'. Referred to as agency costs, the separation of ownership and control should have a negative impact on firm value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) focus on another aspect: if the size of a firm increases most likely agency costs will be larger, because it will be more difficult for owners to control the management and therefore monitoring expenditures will be higher. Agency costs can be reduced if the principal provides appropriate incentives for the agent. One possibility to align managers' interests with those of shareholders is to give managers shares in the firm. Thus, the performance of a firm should be positively related to the fraction of managerial ownership: the higher it is, the higher firm value should be. According to Fama (1980) agency conflicts between owners and managers due to the separation of ownership and control can be solved in another way: managers face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services. This explanation requires efficient labour markets. Fama argues that the divorce of ownership from control can be viewed as an efficient form of economic organization. On the one hand, agency conflicts due to the separation can have an impact on firm value and on the other hand, agency costs can be reduced and even be interpreted as an efficient form of organization. This argumentation is widely disputed in the literature:
A contrary view has been developed by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . Demsetz conceives the ownership structure of a firm as an endogenous outcome of a maximizing process, i.e. owners determine the structure in a systematically value-maximizing manner. Nevertheless, agency costs due to the separation of ownership and control can occur: 'In a world in which self-interest plays a significant role in economic behaviour, it is foolish to believe that owners of valuable resources systematically relinquish control to managers who are not guided to serve their interest.' Demsetz' rationale is that product market competition forces firms to adopt cost-minimizing governance structures. Thus, the ownership structure cannot have any impact on the performance of a firm since ex ante it is optimally chosen. In an empirical test using accounting data Demsetz and Lehn show that there is no significant correlation and especially no significant positive relationship between level of ownership concentration and profit rate. The implication for IPOs of family firms is that the separation of ownership and control after the IPO should not reduce firm value. Under simplifying assumptions the family shareholders' decision to alter the ownership structure of the firm from concentrated to diffuse should not have a significant impact on the stock price performance. The hypothesis is that the stock price performance of an unseasoned firm should follow the predictions of market efficiency. No abnormal performance should be observed. In case Demsetz and Lehn's assumptions are not accepted, it can be assumed that ownership concentration and performance are correlated.
Ownership Structure
Based on Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency model Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a univariate signalling model in which the value of the firm, immediately subsequent to the issue of new shares, is positively related to the percentage ownership retained by the entrepreneur. In case of an IPO, old investors usually have a substantial informational advantage over new investors. Leland and Pyle's signalling argument implies that pre-offering investors retaining a high share of equity in an IPO firm hold a less diversified private portfolio. Thus, they will only be willing to take this unique risk -a risk that potentially could be eliminated by diversification -if they are convinced about the firm's future growth prospectus. Consequently, the higher the fraction of equity retained, the higher the entrepreneur's expectations and vice versa. Investors in an IPO will realize this mechanism and will be willing to pay more for shares in a high quality firm, where the entrepreneur retains a large equity fraction. How and Low (1993) argue that the fractional ownership retained by the issuers is a key determinant of firm value. Thus, there should be a positive linear relation between the entrepreneurial ownership and the market value of the firm. In case of family-owned firms the entrepreneurial control is often exerted by family members, thus this linear relation could be assumed for most of the firms in the sample. The empirical evidence for this linearity hypothesis is dichotomous. Boehmer (1993) shows that, inconsistent with Leland and Pyle's model, firm size is an important determinant of the relation between percentage ownership and firm value.
14 Nevertheless, both the signalling and the agency hypothesis imply a positive correlation between ownership retention and the market value of a firm.
Contrary to Demsetz and Lehn's hypothesis, Stulz (1988) , too, argues that ownership structure is a determinant of corporate value, but focuses on another aspect: in his model the market for corporate control is a way to discipline managers. He uses the relation between inside holdings and the probability of a takeover as a function of the premium a bidder has to pay. On the one side, the takeover premium increases the higher inside holdings by the management are. On the other side, the probability of a hostile takeover decreases with the inside fraction. Contrary to Leland and Pyle's linear model, Stulz argues that the value of a firm is positively related to the fraction of voting rights controlled by the management for low fractions and negatively related as the fraction becomes larger. Thus, there is an optimal level of inside holdings which maximizes firm value. The optimal fraction of inside ownership should be 50%. In a long-run event study on the aftermarket performance of German family-firm IPOs, Ehrhardt (1999) confirms Stulz' results showing that post-IPO performance is higher 14 Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) highlight that the adverse selection cost as postulated by Leland and Pyle (1977) is a more serious obstacle to the listing of young and small companies, e.g. in the United States, than for older and larger companies, e.g. in Europe.
when a fraction of 25% to 50% is retained by family shareholders. Using Tobin's q as a proxy for firm performance 15 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) as well as McConnell and Servaes (1990) confirm Stulz' prediction of a significant, non-linear relation. Where the first find a N-shaped relation, i.e. positive relation for fractions smaller than 5% and larger than 25% and a negative relation betwixt, the latter, using different methods, find out, that the relation is positive for equity holdings smaller than some 40% to 50% and negative for larger fractions, which is consistent with Stulz The importance of large shareholders, e.g. family ownership, is also analyzed in another strand of literature. Public firms in different economies are organized and governed in different ways. 16 Whereas corporate governance in the United States and the United Kingdom can be characterized by dispersed shareholdings and liquid security markets -the socalled market-based system -the governance system in Germany traditionally is defined by concentrated shareholding structures by families and banks. German banks and insurance companies hold significant shares in public corporations and play a dominant role in board representation and proxy voting. 17 Franks and Mayer (2001) present a more detailed overview on ownership and control mechanisms in German corporations. Lehmann and Weigand (2000) analyze the operational performance of 361 German public and private firms and document that ownership concentration affects firm performance in a somehow puzzling matter.
The question is if family investors can discipline poorly performing management and thus, if family ownership -as a large shareholder willing and able to monitor the management -has a positive impact on the value of a firm? The basic assumption is that for an individual shareholder the cost of obtaining 15 Tobin's q is equal to the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of its physical assets; see e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), p. 296. q can be interpreted as a proxy for the firm's valuable intangible assets, e.g. management quality. 16 For a detailed description of corporate control mechanisms and their effectiveness in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany see e.g. Prowse (1995) . 17 See e.g. Edwards and Nibler (2000) or Gorton and Schmid (2000) .
information could outweigh his benefit of gaining that information. 18 Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) develop a theoretical model and argue 'that large outside investors could play an important role by monitoring management actions and influencing management decisions to favour shareholders, thereby improving the performance of a corporation and raising the price of its stock'.
Definition of Family Firms
So far, neither academics, professionals nor jurisprudence were able to develop a precise definition of family firms, 19 mostly because a broad range of company types, especially in Germany, can be considered as family-owned, varying from a founder's start-up company to mature and large family-owned conglomerates. In addition, family firms can be organized in any possible legal form. Due to the scope of this paper as an empirical study it is important to employ a pursuable definition instead of qualitative and individual assessments.
Sociological literature delivers a spectrum of definitions with regard to the term 'family' and how its role changed over time. Based on the German Grundgesetz, Article 6, the core family can be defined as a married couple including their children. Due to the fact that German family-owned firms are comparatively old when going public, the family is defined as a group of people in a kinsman like relationship descended from one marriage as well as their spouses.
In a next step the family has to be linked to a company. The basic idea is that the founder, his family and his descendants have shaped the company with their standards and ideals at some time. The main criterion to define a company as family-owned or as a family firm (Familienunternehmen) seems to be the percentage of family ownership. Influencing a company seems to be possible if a family holds the majority of voting rights. Parts of the literature mention a threshold of 50% plus one vote held by family members. 20 The percentage of equity ownership seems to be a reasonable criterion for the 18 E.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) develop a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to that free-rider problem. 19 Ehrhardt and Nowak (2002a) 21 , BMW presumably could not be considered as family-owned because of the way the company is organized and managed. Not only because of this argument but due to problems obtaining precise information about ownership structures before and immediately after the IPO, the fractional equity ownership as a sole criterion appears insufficient for describing and defining a family-owned firm. 22 The definition used in this paper is based on Klein (2000) , employing two additional criteria: the fraction of family members in the managingcommittee and in the supervisory board. 23 A universal guideline for the classification as a family firm according to Davis (1983) can be summarized as follows: A family business is an organization in which 'policy and direction are subject to significant influence by one ore more family units through ownership and sometimes through the participation of family members in management'. With the exception of the ownership criterion, where a minimum of 25% held by family members is required, the percentage can -theoretically -vary between 0% and 100%, resulting in almost 'pure' company types: familyowned, family-managed and family-controlled firms. The formal definition is: Both, the chairman of the management board and the chairman of the supervisory board have more power than other members of the two boards. Thus, if one of these two positions is occupied by a family 21 member, the fraction of family members in the management respectively supervisory board is multiplied by the factor 1.5 to take into account the importance of the position. Contrary to the above mentioned intention of developing a pursuable definition, in 28 out of 174 cases parts of the required information were not available in order to employ the formal definition. Due to the relative high age of German family firms one specific problem has to be considered: Several generations after the founder, his family often expands and includes distant relatives or in-law relatives with different family names. In these cases individual tests regarding age and character of the company were performed. Another obstacle is the participation of employees on German supervisory boards due to the German co-determination which dilutes the control rights associated with equity ownership. Nevertheless, companies are included if there was a direct link to one ore more families at the time of the IPO. The underlying rationale is the delimitation of closely-held family firms versus anonymous public corporations. Thus, young founder's companies with a direct link to one or more founders who shape the business with their personality are included, as an exception of a family firm. 24 
Family Firms and Private Benefits
On the one hand, the family owner's decisions of how to go public and about the future ownership structure will be driven by the notion of maximizing the longrun return derived from the equity fraction held. On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that pre-IPO investors could have substantial private benefits of keeping control over the company. These private benefits could outweigh the above mentioned disadvantages regarding the level of IPO proceeds. 25 Private benefits seem to be comparatively high in Germany. Table 2 : pecuniary versus non-pecuniary reasons and the transferability of private benefits of control. Obviously, family-owned firms are associated with the existence of (large) private benefits. Family ownership is often interpreted as a proxy for private benefits in the empirical literature. 28 Benefits associated with control rights seem more valuable for private than for institutional owners. Especially the reputational class of private benefits plays an important role in case of family firms. Family owners receive a high social prestige by owning a firm with a good reputation. Often family members and relatives are promoted into positions of senior management although being less qualified than outside professional managers. Some founder's companies can be described as autocratic. These types of private benefits cannot easily be transferred to another owner. They are exclusive to the current owners, as their existence requires e.g. a large family, a root in a certain geographical region and -more important -a long time to build. These aspects illustrate a major peculiarity of the German corporate governance system in comparison to the system in the United States, where agency conflicts are often analyzed from the view of the hostile takeover literature instead of private benefit research. E.g. Grossman and Hart (1988) focus on takeover bids as a mechanism for allocating control with two types of (mostly pecuniary) control benefits: (i) Benefits to security holders and (ii) private benefits to the controlling owner. In comparison, the German market for corporate control can be characterized by hostility much less. Instead negotiated sales of blocks and acquisitions of shares in the open stock market have been the most important mechanisms for corporate control transactions. 29 Nevertheless, for the purpose of an empirical study it is difficult (i) to determine adequate proxies for private benefits of control and (ii) to quantify them.
On the other hand, in regard of reputational private benefits one could argue that their existence does not alter the wealth of ouside investors. This argument can be contrasted with Jensen's (2001) achievements in regard of the dimensions of value maximizing. 'The existence of any private benefit -whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary -which is not shared with the minority shareholders gives the controlling owner an incentive to deviate from the maximization of total firm value.' 30 
Private Benefits and the Decision to Go Public
Bebchuk (1999) describes the entrepreneur's decision whether to maintain control over the company when going public by choosing a concentrated or dispersed ownership structure. This decision is influenced by the magnitude of private benefits of control. The entrepreneur faces two possibilities: 29 See e.g. Franks and Mayer (2001) , Gorton and Schmid (2000) or Prowse (1995 -If private benefits of control are small the entrepreneur will choose a dispersed ownership structure by issuing common stock (ordinary shares). He has no need to protect his control rights.
-If the value of private benefits is high the entrepreneur will more likely maintain control. 'Maintaining a lock on control would enable the company's initial shareholders to capture a larger fraction of the surplus from value-producing transfers of control' caused by the IPO.
A most common way to keep control over a company is to separate cash flow rights from voting rights by introducing a dual class share structure of ordinary shares and non-voting preference shares. Other instruments to separate control and cash flow rights include stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures. All three means enable a shareholder to exercise control while holding only a small equity fraction. 31 While initial owners keep the ordinary voting stock, non-voting preference shares are sold to the public. Thus, the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights will be most likely used in conjunction with a controlling shareholder, e.g. family ownership, but not with a dispersed ownership structure. 32 Summarized by Mello and Parsons (1998): 'When private benefits of control are significant and voting rights can be isolated from cash flow rights it may be best for the seller to deviate from one vote per share, but not otherwise. ' Bebchuk and Zingales (2000) show that the ownership structure chosen by a value-maximizing entrepreneur at the IPO might deviate from the socially optimal solution, because of the external effect that the choice of ownership structure has on 31 See e.g. Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) providing an overview on these mechanisms. potential future buyers of control. 33 Rational entrepreneurs will fully internalize the effects of ownership structure on their future wealth and they will internalize the effects of ownership structure on dispersed shareholders as these effects are reflected in the IPO price. But the entrepreneur does not internalize the effects of ownership structure on the surplus captured by future blockholders. As ownership structure influences (i) the terms when a control transfer might occur and (ii) the surplus captured by potential controlling buyers only in perfectly competitive markets for corporate control, the optimal choice of ownership structure from the entrepreneur's point of view coincides with the socially efficient capital structure. Consistent with Pagano (1993) it can be assumed that in underdeveloped capital markets the privately optimal choice of ownership structure should differ from the socially efficient structure. Where the impact of post-IPO transfers of control on minority shareholders will be negative, e.g. in countries with relatively low investor protection, only a small number of companies will be publicly listed. Combining Bebchuck's (1999) and Bebchuk and Zingales' (2000) analyses, listed firms tend to have an ownership structure, in which the initial owner retains control but sells some of the cash-flow rights to outside investors, if private benefits of control are large, and entrepreneurs will chose this type of structure even if a structure with dispersed ownership is more efficient from a social point of view.
Although the models mentioned above predict different outcomes, they can be summarized as follows: Private benefits can have a strong impact on the ownership structure chosen when going public and determine control structures, i.e. their existence can lead to dual class share structures -if allowed.
Family Firms and Dual Class Shares
Dual Class Share Structures, Private Benefits and Empirical Evidence
The simultaneous issuance of ordinary stock and non-voting preferred stock enables family owners to diversify cash flow rights while keeping control over the company. Investors in preferred stock face one disadvantage: Preference shares usually trade with a discount to ordinary shares. According to Ehrhardt and Nowak (2000a) the price difference has a long term mean of 17.9%. 34 On the other hand, preference 33 The basic idea that the entrepreneur's choice might deviate from the socially efficient choice was introduced by Grossman and Hart (1980 shares usually earn a higher and/or guaranteed dividend. Contrary to the empirical findings, the neoclassical theory argues that due to the higher dividend preference shares should trade at a higher price and therefore should have a higher market value. On the other hand, it is argued that voting rights bear an economic value, which increases the valuation of ordinary shares. Another argument is that preference shares are less known to investors and therefore less traded. Controlling shareholders, such as families, can use these dual class share structures in order to protect their private benefits. According to Rydqvist (1992) in some countries, e.g. Switzerland, dual class share structures are even used as a protection mechanism to keep foreign investors from taking control of domestic firms.
In their analysis of Swedish seasoned equity offerings, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2002) show that family owners use an offering method that is least likely to dilute their controlling stake and increases monitoring by a new blockholder. Even more, family owners will not issue at all, if the resulting ownership structure is one where they face an 'unacceptable' dilution of control. Rydqvist and Hoegholm (1995) find out that in a sample of 166 Swedish IPOs of family-owned firms between 1970 and 1991 more than 90% of the firms use dual class share structures. They argue that the risk of losing control is a cost of public ownership and thus takeover defenses -i.e. dual class shares, limitation of voting rights, pyramidal structures, etc. -are used to reduce this risk. For a sample of 105 German IPOs of familyowned firms Ehrhardt and Nowak (2002a) confirm Bebchuck's (1999) hypothesis that non-voting shares are used where family owners retain the majority of voting rights. Family shareholders still hold 51.8% (72.9%) in 44 dual class firms 10 (5) years after the IPO, whereas family owners in single class firms lose the majority of voting rights at some time between 3 to 5 years after the IPO.
Holmen and Hoegfeldt's (2002) analysis supports the view that the issuance of ordinary and preferred stock, resulting in a dual class share structure, is directly correlated with the existence of private benefits of control. They show that controlling shareholders in dual class firms never sell their stakes piece by piece but only in a block trade associated with a control premium that reflects the value of control rights. In summary: It can be argued that dual 101 class share structures are most typical with concentrated ownership structures driven by entrepreneurs or families who try to keep their private benefits of control.
Accordant with Zingales (1995) , Gomes (2000) views the IPO as the first step in the eventual sale of a company. Using a multiperiod model, Gomes shows that an IPO does not need to be in disfavor of minority shareholders and that controlling shareholder structures might even be beneficial. Sheehan (2000) states: 'If the controlling shareholder cares about his reputation because of possible future sales of stock, dual class and pyramidal structures allow more of those future sales without losing control of the firm.' Family reputation and interaction can provide an important constraint on managerial self-dealing. 35 Thus, owners of family firms seem to be able to realize private benefits from control of their corporation without sacrificing firm performance.
Family Owners as a Unique Class of Shareholders
Family shareholders represent a unique class of shareholders, mostly because they hold poorly diversified private portfolios, they are long term investors and they regularly control senior management positions. Thus, this section presents a summarizing overview on various hypothetical advantages and disadvantages of family ownership.
Advantages of family ownership include: -Families have longer investment horizons and stronger incentives to invest, resulting in greater investment efficiency and faster growth. Thus, families do not monitor only effectively and efficiently, but optimize decisions within the family and future family members in mind. 36 Moreover, these monitoring activities can be associated with learning curve effects.
-In line with Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency view on the firm, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that family relationships among ownermanagers should reduce agency costs and as a consequence firm value should increase.
-Concentrated ownership can reduce agency conflicts resulting in higher firm value -mostly because in family firms the family's wealth is directly linked to firm performance and firm value as argued by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) .
-DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) suggest that family involvement serves to monitor and discipline managers because of long term relationships between family members and with the firm. This connection reduces the probability that a short-sighted management omits good investment projects to raise current earnings.
-The existence of owner-managers in family firms, characterized by high family commitment and strong family ties, forges a straightforward decisionmaking and an entrepreneurial spirit offering family firms competitive advantages over non-family firms.
-Family ownership ensures a continuous leadership with lower management turnover. The longevity especially of German family firms often spans several generations.
-Because of the longevity of family firms and related reputational aspects, other stakeholders, e.g. suppliers or banks, are more likely to deal with family firms rather than with comparable non-family firms with relatively high management turnover.
-Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) argue that family firms will face a lower cost of debt financing in comparison to non-family firms because their specific incentive structures result in fewer agency conflicts. Bond holders seem to view family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.
-As family owners tend to be risk-averse family firms try to reduce the level of debt. Higher levels of debt increase the probability of bankruptcy and of loss of control of the firm as argued by Mishra and McConaughy (1999) .
-Family firms are associated with a clear and strong corporate identity, high loyalty of employees, a family tradition and strong geographical ties in one region.
- Davis (1983) points out what distinguishes successful family firms from other non-family businesses is the level of trust and altruism, commitment, concern for the long run and love for the firm. According to Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) stewardship theory can be used to explain situations of separated ownership and control in which managers -if family members or not -are not motivated by their own interest, but rather act as stewards ('agents') whose motives are aligned with their principals' objectives.
On the other side, disadvantages of family ownership include:
-Outsiders, as reported in anecdotal accounts in the popular press, view family firms as associated with very high levels of in-transparency. A most popular argument for undervaluing family businesses is a 'hankey-pankey' behavior of acts of grafting.
-Families have incentives and the power to skim private benefits at the expense of firm performance. Minority shareholders will be expropriated. E.g. family owners are able to expropriate wealth from the firm by overpaying themselves. Often related-party transactions can be observed.
-Families pursuing their own interest, i.e. individualistic, opportunistic and self-serving behaviour, can adversely affect employee effort and productivity. 37 -It is often argued that there is no corporate governance in German family firms due to a lacking 37 See Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), p. 702. market of corporate control. Instead, some family firms can be characterized by an autocratic style of management.
-Family owners, especially the founder's generation, often cannot diversify their private portfolios against the specific risks afforded by the commercial operations of the firm. Lack of success and failure of the firm may financially ruins the whole family. 38 -Family owners often view their firms as an asset to bequeath to the next generation. 39 The preceding generation values firm survival over wealth maximization. If separated, family owners prefer to maximize firm value rather than shareholder value.
-Family owners may derive greater benefits from purposes such as longevity, social and ecological responsibility, technical innovations, growth or firm survival rather than from increasing shareholder value. As a consequence outside investors will undervalue the firm resulting in higher capital costs.
-Because family owners fear to lose control of the firm they can restrict the company's growth by themselves, e.g. if a capital increase would dilute family ownership. Family owners tend to be less willing to take risk. 40 -Controlling ownership stakes reduce the probability of hostile bids, reducing the value of the firm. 41 -Conflicts may arise between family members who are actively working in the firm versus those who are solely shareholders. 42 As there is no separation between family and business relationships and families get larger, especially over time, family members' interests tend to diverge, leading to and resulting in conflicts and struggles.
-The twofold financial needs of the firm and the family can be a serious difficulty for family owners and can lead to conflicts over strategic decisions within the firm and different investment decision rules can be employed. 43 -Often family members and relatives are promoted into positions of senior management although being less qualified than outside professional managers. This behaviour reduces the firm's attractiveness on human resource markets.
-Severe problems are associated with family succession. Often founders or family managers remain active even if they are no longer competent or qualified to run the business.
-Often family owners are embedded in communities and in networks. 44 Social and political reputation or regional importance may prevent family 38 owners to take grievously steps, e.g. reducing staff, closing plants, etc., even if these actions are operationally necessary.
Despite theoretical models, argumentations and empirical findings, ownership structure seems to affect firm performance and firm value. If family ownership provides competitive advantages (disadvantages) to the firm, a better (inferior) firm performance should be observed in family firms versus non-family firms. Summarizing the above mentioned sources, a puzzling picture is left. On the one hand, controlling family shareholders are associated with better monitoring functions as larger ownership fractions allow them to obtain larger stakes of the firm value. Thus, concentrated ownership could be seen as beneficial. 45 On the other hand, research focusing on family firms indicates that families do not primarily maximize shareholder value. Investors in family firms have difficulties in valuing properly. Thus, family firms should be undervalued relative to the market investment rule. This effect may be limited by family firm specific matters: 'Family ties, loyalty, insurance and stability are expected to be effective in lengthening the horizons of managers and in providing the incentives for family managers to make efficient investments in the family business.' 46 Finally, this Chapter does not conclude with a clear and definite hypothesis publicizing either underout-or neutral performance of family-owned firms.
4
Data and Methodology
Sample Data and Descriptive Statistics
The initial data sample is comprised of 395 IPOs between 1977 and 1998. Using the definition developed in the previous Chapter, in a first step 208 IPOs were identified as flotations of family firms. Not only because of data requirements and comparability with former studies the event window of 1977 to 1998 was chosen for the following reasons: on the one hand, only very little IPO activity took place before 1977. For example Ehrhardt and Nowak (2000a) identify only one family-owned firm that went public between 1970 and 1976. The corporate tax reform in 1977 (Koerperschaftssteuer-Reform) eliminated the double taxation on dividend payments making a flotation in the German stock market more attractive. Figure 1 shows that it needed another 6 years up to 1983 though, before a larger number of firms went public. It seems reasonable to mention that 8 out of 10 firms in 1983 were not included due to data unavailability or the flotation on the Ungeregelter Freiverkehr. On the other side, restricting the sample to the end of 1998 facilitates the analysis of the long-run performance for at least up to 36 months over an event window of 25 years, i.e. from 1977 to 2001. As a result, the data sample is as recent as possible. Another conclusion presented by Figure 1 is that, apparently, there is no specific 'hot issue' or 'cold issue' period in the subsample period of 1983 to 1998. To achieve a homogenous data basis the initial sample had to meet the following criteria, partially suggested by Ritter (1991) 
Long-Run Abnormal Return Construction
Numerous studies document that the results of longrun event studies highly depend on the research design, addressing two major issues: the calculation of returns and the choice of benchmark. 48 The first decision determines the event window length. While earlier studies on German IPOs examined long-run performance for only 1 year, 49 48 See e.g. Barber and Lyon (1997) The second choice refers to the weighting scheme of returns over a number of observations. Fama (1998) and Brav et al. (2000) point out that the usage of equally weighted or value-weighted returns highly depends on the researcher´s aim: While equally weighted returns are the preferred method when examining potential stock market mispricings, the authors recommend value-weighted returns when measuring the average investors´ wealth change attributable to an event. In their study on tests of market efficiency Loughran and Ritter (2000) strongly prefer equally weighted returns. 50 Thus, equally weighted returns are used in this paper. 51 Analyzing long-run performance for up to 5 years requires stock prices for each company for this period of time. The data sample used in this study contains 3 companies whose return series are shorter than that. 52 Hence, the third decision is how to treat these companies. Excluding these firms leads to a so-called survivorship bias. 53 In place of only full series of returns, truncated return series are used, i.e. all firms in the data sample are included regardless of the length of their return series. While this paper includes IPOs floated in 1997 and 1998 stock price data is not available for the fourth and fifth year of the listing. Unlike other studies, these 25 firms will be included in the 36-month analysis but excluded in the 60-Ehrhardt (1997) p. 173, Ljungqvist (1993) is the first one employing a 36-month holding period for a German data sample. 50 See Loughran and Ritter (2000), p. 363: 'But if one is trying to measure the abnormal returns on the average firm undergoing some event, then each firm should be weighted equally.' The idea behind this refers to the observation that most abnormal patterns are stronger for smaller firms. Because of extremely large size differences apparent anomalies could shrink or even disappear when using value-weighted instead of equally weighted return series. 51 For the German capital market Ehrhardt (1997) 54 exclude the first month and start computing returns with the first trading day of the month following the IPO, it is argued that this procedure could cause a bias. Consequently return series start immediately on the first day of trading with the first available spot quotation available from KKMDB. Initial returns are not included for the following reason: as equity offerings are usually oversubscribed 'most investors simply do not have the opportunity to acquire all new issues at the offering price'. 55 Including initial returns, although correct in theory, would lead to a trading strategy that only a small number of investors could retrace.
The fifth decision determines over which period of time returns are measured, i.e. daily, weekly or monthly returns. Brown and Warner (1985) state that potential biases increase, the shorter the return measure period is. Not surprisingly, empirical literature established the monthly return measurement. 56 Raw returns are calculated as follows:
where P i,t denotes the last available price for stock i in month t. This study follows Ritter´s (1991) suggestion and defines a month as a 21-trading-day period relative to the IPO date. This proceeding has two major benefits: (i) Turn-of-the-month effects as a potential seasonal anomaly are excluded and (ii) the return series start with a full month in comparison to the conventional proceeding where a truncated month is compared to a full calendar month of benchmark performance.
Besides the choice of benchmark most important, the researcher has to select an appropriate return measure. Two common measures are (i) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and (ii) buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). 57 Barber and Lyon (1997) present a detailed description on both methods. In general, CARs are calculated by summarizing monthly abnormal returns whereas BHARs are the difference of the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm less the return on a buyand-hold investment in an appropriate benchmark/portfolio. Thus, CARs ignore compounding whereas BHARs include the compounding effect. abnormal performance.' 58 From an investor´s point of view, BHARs should be used as they minimize transaction costs because an equally weighted CAR strategy implies costly monthly rebalancing. In addition, CARs 'are a biased predictor of long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns'. 59 CARs tend to be positively biased. Kothari and Warner (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) find out that, in comparison to CARs, BHARs 'accurately represent investor experience' but are 'more sensitive to the problem of cross-sectional dependence among sample firms […]'. 60 As beginning with Ritter's (1991) 
A second widely employed measure of secondary market performance is the wealth relative, denoted as WR , which was initially used in this context by Ritter (1991) . According to Loughran and Ritter (1995) the rationale is to define a measure that indicates the investment in IPOs that is required in order to have the same wealth at the end of the holding period as would be produced by an investment in the benchmark portfolio. A wealth relative greater than 1 indicates outperformance relative to the benchmark, whereas underperformance is expressed by a wealth relative smaller than 1. Ritter (1991) defines the wealth relative WR as follows: RPF is 0.60. Using formula, the wealth relative is 0.75. Investing 100 units in the reference portfolio, the investor would achieve 160 units at the end of the event window. Instead of 100 units an investors had to invest 133.33 units in issuing firms to achieve the same wealth. 61 Significance tests are employed to test whether the average abnormal return is significant different from zero. Presuming that abnormal returns are normally distributed, a simple t-statistic is the researcher´s preferred choice.
Most of the more recent empirical studies state that the distribution of abnormal returns cannot be approximated with the normal distribution due to a strong positive skewness leading to misspecifications 58 of any parametric test, especially the parametric ttest. 62 While older studies only describe this phenomenon, a broad range of statistics-based literature presents improved test-specifications. In their seminal article on the specifications of long-run event studies, Barber and Lyon (1997) document that the (positive) skewness bias implies negatively biased t-statistics. According to Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) reported p-values will be smaller than they should be. These authors suggest the use of a transformed t-statistic which was originally documented by Johnson (1978) and which reduces the effect of skewness. The skewness-adjusted t-statistic is defined as: While Sutton (1993) recommends a bootstrapped application, Lyon et al. (1999) argue that only a bootstrapped application of the skewness-adjusted test statistic yields well-specified test statistics. 63 As bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics are not undisputable in the empirical and theoretical literature it seems appropriate to report the results of a non-parametric sign test which tests the median of the distribution of abnormal returns. 64 The sign test does not require the assumption that the population is normally distributed. It tests whether the probability that the difference between the number of positive and negative initial returns is positive is greater than the probability that the difference is negative. The null hypothesis is that the median is equal to zero, i.e. that both probabilities are equal. 62 
Benchmark Formation
Neither academics nor professionals were able to develop an approved model to precisely forecast expected returns of shares. The market-adjustedreturn approach, as required by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), is commonly used in longrun event studies. 65 Because of complexity the market portfolio cannot be determined empirically. Thus, a proxy variable has to be employed, often referred to as benchmark.
Results of long-run studies are highly sensitive to the choice of an appropriate benchmark for the calculation of abnormal returns. Numerous empirical as well as simulation studies discuss this issue. Among others, Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) use the most common stock indices in the United States as well as size and book-to-market portfolios and show that the results differ. Levis (1993) employs, both, value-and equally weighted all-share indices as well as a small cap index for his sample of IPO firms in the United Kingdom. Sapusek (2000) is among the first who uses a broad set of benchmarks to measure post-IPO performance on the German capital market. She detects under-, neutral and outperformance depending on the choice of benchmark.
Some 30 years ago the question was raised: 'Is it appropriate to compare the performance of an individual stock with the performance of a portfolio of stocks?' 66 Not surprisingly, the majority of IPO longrun performance studies uses at least one of the three basic approaches: (i) A stock index as a benchmark, (ii) assigning every IPO in the sample to a non-issuing matching firm and (iii) sizematched portfolios.
Employing an index as a proxy for the expected return of a stock is probably the least time-consuming approach which, in addition, reflects a naïve investor's point of view of comparing the performance of his IPO firm portfolio to any index certificate. Nevertheless, a major disadvantage refers to the fact that the index most likely includes the subject to be examined. Barber and Lyon (1997) refer to this phenomenon as the new listing bias. Another potential argument against an index benchmark is provided by the results of a simulation study on the benchmark effect in long-run event studies presented by Ehrhardt and Koerstein (2001) . The authors conclude, that in comparison to the matching firm and size portfolio approach, a value-and equally weighted stock index, e.g. the DAX, biases the results the most. Thus, they reject the idea that any index could be an appropriate benchmark in long-run event studies.
The second approach matches every IPO firm to 65 Usually market-adjusted returns are stated as: 67 and a skewness bias 68 . This approach should be appropriate in large capital markets, e.g. in the United States and in the United Kingdom. It seems reasonable that non-issuing companies matched by industry and size should, in general, have similar characteristics. In this case risk seems to be better taken into account in comparison to market-adjustments. However, a major concern against the employment of the control firm approach to the German capital market is the latter's small size. The main argument is that only a very small number of listed firms exist within one industry. The first consequence is that percental differences in size between a pair of IPO and non-issuing firm could be relatively high. The second shortcoming is that most likely certain firms are used more than once as a control firm. Thus, this study does not employ the control firm approach as results, using German stock price data, tend to be arbitrary.
A third possibility is to compare a sample of IPO firms to reference portfolios instead of individual firms. A very common method is to construct 10 sizebased portfolios of all available non-issuing firms and rebalance them every year. In their simulations Barber and Lyon (1997) show that reference portfolios yield misspecified test statistics. Thus, the authors do not recommend this approach for a data sample in the United States. On the other hand, Stehle, Ehrhardt and Przyborowsky (2000) show that size portfolios are more accurate than index benchmarks. As similar problems occur as described within the matching firm approach this paper does not employ the size portfolio method.
Especially the discussion on the choice of benchmark shows that there is no 'best' method to measure abnormal stock price performance. Due to the size and scope of this paper and its plausible character abnormal performance will be measured against the DAFOX provided by KKMDB. The DAFOX is a value-weighted all share index covering the whole population of the Amtlicher Handel, the prime segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange. Contrary to the DAX, the DAFOX is a total-return index. Most important the DAFOX includes dividend payments. It can be concluded that the combination of BHARs and an index cannot be considered as the 'best' method. More detailed research for international capital markets provides a manifold picture. The proceeding used in this study tries to take into account the relatively small size of the German 67 In comparison to the matching firm approach, size portfolios and indices have to be rebalanced periodically while the returns of the sample are compounded without rebalancing. 68 The skewness bias is eliminated when using the matching firm approach because the probability that sample and control firms face positive returns is the same. stock market. It seems that potential biases could increase when using the matching firm or reference portfolio approach. Nowak compute a non-significant underperformance of -8.10% after 36 months. This result can be attributed primarily to the underperformance of issues employing dual-class share structures, i.e. common stock and non-voting preferred stock. Whereas the performance of nondual-class share IPOs is neutral and not significantly different from zero, the underperformance of dualclass share issues is higher with -19.60% and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Empirical Results on Long-Run Performance
In summary: evidence of negative long-run returns for IPO firms is less widely documented than the evidence of underpricing. The few countries with positive long-run results using the standard methodology -BHARs and an index as benchmarkcan be interpreted as the result of different institutional settings in different countries. Nevertheless, up to 1997 most studies documented a long-run underperformance. Cai and Wei (1997) even state that this phenomenon is 'almost universal and has been confirmed in many countries'. More recent studies emphasizing model specification problems show that IPOs do not perform statistically significant different from seasoned firms. The most recent strand of IPO research holds misspecification of models responsible for the widely documented long-run underperformance of IPOs. The most common excuse formulated by the efficient market hypothesis is the failure to properly adjust for risk. Nevertheless, although evidence on family-firm long-run stock performance is very scarce other types of empirical research, e.g. using accounting data, seem to confirm the long-run underperformance of family firms. Morck, Strangeland and Yeung (1998) find out that firms controlled by heirs have lower returns on sales and assets and their growth is less than or equal to the development observed in other comparable firms. Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) state that familyowned and family-managed firms appear least efficient in generating profits. Sources: See references. Where more than one author or one study is listed as a source of information, combined samples have been constructed by calculating arithmetic means. 'Months' describes the event window, i.e. the number of months over which after-market returns are recorded. Returns are calculated over the event window and are not annualized. Initial returns are excluded. Returns are generally market-adjusted. Where more than one benchmark and one method of computation are used, a representative result is shown.
Empirical Evidence on Long-Run Performance 5.2.1 Unadjusted Returns and Tests for Normality
Excluding initial returns, an investment strategy that invested the same amount of money in every IPO regardless of its size earned 8.46% after 12 months, 11.79% after 3 years and 19.29% after 5 years.
The distribution of unadjusted monthly returns for a 36-month holding period does not follow a normal distribution. The assumption of normality can be rejected. (i) Values for standardized skewness (-5.2846) and kurtosis (5.1377) are outside the ±2-range of normality, (ii) the median (0.5033%) is higher than the value for the mean (0.1953%) and (iii) the result of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the normality hypothesis has to be rejected with 99% confidence. The rejection of the normality hypothesis is confirmed when using 12-as well as full and truncated 60-month monthly returns. Thus, subsequent statistical testing has to be interpreted with caution.
5.2.2
Adjusted Returns This section summarizes the results of benchmark adjusted long-run returns. Abnormal returns are used to verify or falsify the predictions of market efficiency, i.e. the abnormal performance of shares after an IPO should be neutral. Investing in IPO firms should not yield abnormal profits nor excess losses. Table 4 provides an overview on BHARs. The evidence presented in Table 4 confirms that the price adjustment due to the flotation is completed during the first week of trading as mean BHRs during the first week are very small. The mean BHAR amounts to an underperformance of -0.54% at the end of the first week of trading. A simple t-test indicates insignificance, whereas a sign test testing the median BHAR of -1.14% indicates significance. The mean BHAR remains negative until the end of the 60-month period with an exception of the 3-and 6-month periods. The null hypothesis for the mean BHAR to equal null cannot be rejected until month 12. Mean BHAR turn significantly negative for the 36-and 60-month periods. Contrary to the mean BHAR, the median BHAR remains negative and statistically significant different from zero independently from the event window length. 1 month after the flotation both the mean and the median BHAR are negative with -0.36% and -2.43%, respectively. After 3 (6) months the mean BHAR turns insignificantly positive with 0.27% (0.33%) while the median BHAR stays negative with -1.19% (-2.42%). After one year the extent of the negative median BHAR increases to -8.06%, while the mean BHAR stays insignificantly small with -1.23%. The results for the long term performance are more explicit: Both the -25.31% mean BHAR and the -28.69% median BHAR after 36 months are statistically significant different from zero at the 99.9% confidence level. The results aggravate after 60 months: The mean BHAR equals -53.5%, the median BHAR is -43.29%. A wealth relative of 0.8154 after 36 months and 0.6904 after 60 months confirms the underperformance of family firms in comparison to the market. Surprisingly, the extent of underperformance of family-owned IPO firms in Germany floated between 1977 and 1998 is much more pronounced in comparison to the other examinations on the German capital market as shown in Panel E in Table 3 . Analyzing a much longer period of time than Lowinski and Schiereck (2003) , who calculate a significant underperformance of 59.20% after 3 years for a sample of 64 family-owned firms between 1991 and 1998, the mean BHAR of -25.31% presented in this study is much smaller, providing evidence for the hypothesis that the level of underperformance varies over time. For a more comparable sample, Ehrhardt and Nowak (2002a) calculate an underperformance of -8.10% after 36 months. This first overview on secondary market performance indicates the necessity of more detailed research to explain the observed patterns. Figure 2 exhibits the development of mean BHRs and mean BHARs for the entire sample of 174 IPOs. 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 71 The peak in means during the 46th month stems from a dramatic stock price increase of the stock trading company Ballmaier & Schultz that was acquired by Baader Wertpapier GmbH. Its stock price was raised by the factor 6.5. Figure 3 . Firm-specific BHARs after 60 months (1977-1996) Especially in case of the 60-month period analysis the effect of the bootstrapped application of the skewness-adjusted t-test can be observed. Whereas regular tests indicate significant at least at the 90% confidence level, the bootstrapped skewnessadjusted test reports much higher p-values, especially for the 1977 to 1995 period. The results are in line with Sutton's (1993) theoretical explanations that the p-values of non-bootstrapped tests in case of severe skewness are smaller than they should be. Consequently, conventional tests tend to inflate the significance levels. The empirical findings support the methodical objections with regard to the specifications of parametric tests. On the other hand, the differences between non-adjusted t-tests and skewness-adjusted t-tests are comparatively small. In almost all of the examinations they do not change the predictions of significance versus non-significance. Differences between the parametric measures and non-parametric (rank) measures seem notable. Again: since the literature has not established a universal test technique, all statistical tests have to be treated with caution.
Long-Run Performance by Market Segment
Another aspect is the level of abnormal performance at different market segments. Table 8 splits the analysis for long-run returns into four market segments and applicable time periods. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Starting with the analysis of 12-month BHARs, the relatively small range of BHRs (7.99% to 9.40%) and BHARs (-2.65% to 1.59%) for the examination of the entire sample of 174 family firms broadens when splitting the data sample into market segments. IPOs at the Amtlicher Handel earned on average higher BHRs ranging from 10.55% to 15.89%. Mean adjusted returns insignificantly outperformed the market by 6.44% for the subperiod of 1977 to 1995. The stock market decline during the late 1990's affected BHARs for the most recent period: Family firms floated between 1988 and 1998 underperformed with a mean of -1.64% and a median of -9.21%. Returns at the second segment, the Geregelter Markt, were on average smaller. Since its introduction in 1987 family firms only earned 1.54% in absolute measures and significantly underperformed the DAFOX by -5.70%. IPOs at the Geregelter Freiverkehr between 1977 and its discontinuance in 1987 performed worse in comparison to more restrictive market segments. Not surprisingly, 12-month returns at the Neuer Markt outperformed all other family-owned firms as their return series until the end of 1999 were not affected by the subsequent decline. On the other hand, the median 12-month BHAR at the Neuer Markt moderates the outperformance. Excluding the Neuer Markt, the prediction holds true that market segments with more restrictive listing requirements attract companies with -assumably -a higher quality and, as a consequence, superior long-run returns.
The results at the Neuer Markt are even worse when analyzing 36-month returns. 17 flotations of family firms lost some 46% and significantly underperformed the market by -67.18% at the 99% confidence level. IPOs at the Geregelter Freiverkehr between 1977 and 1987 earned the highest raw (44.86%) and market-adjusted returns (7.28%). BHARs do not differ significantly from zero and show the highest standard deviation. Family firms floated at its successor, the Geregelter Markt, did not continue those positive results. Mean (median) BHARs were -9.46% (-20.83%) during the first 9 years and -22.59% (-36.03%) for the period of 1987 to 1998. Examinations for IPOs at the prime segment reveal that their performance is biased by significantly underperforming flotations in the 1995 to 1998 period. Whereas IPOs between 1977 and 1987 earned the highest unadjusted returns and positive marketadjusted returns, both expressed as mean and median, the second group of family businesses that floated their shares at the Amtlicher Handel between 1988 and 1998 faced a statistically significant underperformance of more than -60%. In comparison to 12-month returns the picture for the 36-month holding period is less clear. The correlation between the quality of the market segment and the amount of adjusted performance cannot be transferred to the 36-month analysis. The correlation does not hold true for the 60-month analysis aswell: Earlier IPOs, i.e. between 1977 and 1987, earned higher unadjusted returns at the Geregelter Freiverkehr in comparison to the Amtlicher Handel. The sign changes when examining BHARs. Flotations at the Geregelter Freiverkehr insignificantly underperformed by a mean -7.24% and a median -21.07%. Contrary, IPOs at the Amtlicher Handel insignificantly overperformed by 2.72% and 5.81%, respectively. The puzzle also remains during the second half of the sample period: IPOs at the prime segment earned negative returns after 60 months and significantly underperformed both in terms of means (-131.96%) and medians (-142.54%). Although the performance of family firms floated in 1997 and 1998 is excluded in the 60-month analysis, the remaining sample is affected both by the bullish stock markets until 2000 and the decline since 2000. Probably, these effects are amplified by the compounding calculation method of BHARs. Finally, comparisons of the 3 Panels in Table 8 indicate that the standard deviations of BHARs increased over time, independently of the market segment.
Long-Run Performance by Industry Sector
This section analyzes long-run returns by industry sectors. Industry classifications are based on 11 industry segmentations provided by KKMDB. Table 9 represents the results. 98,75% 1,8941 177,70% 216,04% n/a n/a 229,24% n/a n/a 3 1 Utilities -74,79% 257,32% 0,0705 -332,11% n/a n/a n/a -332,11% n/a n/a 1 1 Transportation & Logistics 15,46% 86,91% 0,6177 -71,45% 240,26% n/a n/a -71,45% n/a n/a 2 1 1) IPOs in 1997 and 1998 are excluded.
The analysis of Table 9 does not provide a clear outcome: The 6 industries displayed first, i.e. consumer goods to miscellaneous, all show a decreasing long-run performance in terms of marketadjusted returns. E.g. the automobile and machinery industries underperform by a significant -8.67% after 12 months, decline to -42.67% after 36 and to -68.07% after 60 months. None of these 6 industries overperforms after 3 and 5 years, respectively. The performance of the remaining 5 industries is ambiguously and has to be treated with extreme caution due to the very small numbers of observations: Whereas the level and direction of their abnormal performance is more distinctive after 12 months in comparison to other industries, this effect even increases after 36 and 60 months. One firm in the utilities sector (Sero Entsorgung AG) underperforms by an extreme -332.11% whereas 3 financial firms outperform by 177.70%. Surprisingly, a sample of 5 industry holdings seems to follow the market performance. An diversification discount cannot be observed.
Comparisons by pairs regarding the 6 largest industry sectors for 12-, 36-and 60-month holding periods do not produce any statistically significant differences at the 90% confidence level. Thus, a buyand-hold investment strategy based on industry sectors did not achieve any persistent advantages.
Long-Run Performance by Ownership Structure
This section investigates the long-run performance of family firm IPOs differentiated by the extent of family involvement in the firm. The segmentation presented in Table 10 is guided by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) as well as Ehrhardt and Nowak (2000a) . Ownership concentration, i.e. the percental fraction of equity held by family members, is employed as an indicator for the degree of power exerted by the family. In case the findings do not present clear evidence that firms with a specific degree of family involvement under-or outperform in comparison to firms with different ownership structures, one could argue that Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) hypothesis and findings are supported. Ownership could be considered as an endogenous outcome which does have no impact on firm value in an efficient capital market. As noted before, long-run performance one year after the IPO does not produce any significant results. The results presented in Panel A, both BHRs and BHARs, offer no clear evidence in favor of one direction. E.g. firms with 90% to 100% family ownership, the largest group, faced an average mean close to zero abnormal return whereas the group with lowest family ownership fractions seems to have similar characteristics. The coefficients of correlation in Table 11 indicate a slightly negative, but nonsignificant correlation. Comparisons by pairs do not produce statistically significant differences.
36-month results, displayed in Panel B, can be interpreted as follows: IPO firms with highest family ownership produce close to zero BHARs as indicated by the mean (-4.82%) and the median (-1.35%). The returns of these 52 firms have one of the lowest standard deviations. Firms with smaller equity stakes held by family members perform worse in terms of BHRs and BHARs. The 80% to 90% group biases the findings because of some outliers. Nevertheless, the coefficients of correlation show a highly significant positive correlation between 36-month BHARs and fractional family ownership. The higher the stake held by family members the better the market-adjusted long-run performance.
A similar relation, although weaker and not significant, can be observed for the 60-month analysis. Firms with very small family ownership stakes perform the best in terms of BHRs. Because of the small number the BHAR of -34.88% is less meaningful, whereas the median is positive with 30.46%. Firms characterized by family ownership between 50% and 90% underperform by some -60% to -75% and have higher standard deviations. The last group where family members hold 90% to 100% earns unadjusted returns of 26.70% but underperforms the market by a significant -32.16%. These findings are opposite to the results presented by Ehrhardt and Nowak (2000a) who detect positive excess returns for voting right concentrations between 25% and 75%. Linear relations, expressed in Table 11 Table 12 . There seems to be clear evidence that 5 firms with the highest family involvement (quotient greater than 250%) underperform the worst after one year, but outperform after 36 and 60 months. Notably, the number is very small and the standard deviations are very high -some twice as high as in other groups. The evidence for the 4 other groups is less definite after 1 year and 3 years. Panel C shows that the higher the level of family influence, the higher the abnormal performance in terms of BHARs. BHARs range from -93.71% to -9.25%. Contrary to the analysis by fractional clusters, the coefficients of correlation presented in Table 13 confirm the findings of this section. p ≤ 0.1 indicates significance at the 10% level, respectively ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.
As argued in Chapter 3.3 family influence should be higher in family-owned businesses where the positions of the chairman of the management board and/or supervisory board are occupied by family members. In line with McConaughy et al. (1998) offering evidence that managerial ownership holds little relation for firm value, it can be hypothesized that it is more important who runs or controls the business. The authors, analyzing operational performance, find empirical support for Fama and Jensen's (1983) suggestions in a sample of 219 founding family controlled firms in the United States that family relationships improve monitoring while providing incentives that are associated with better firm performance. On the other hand, Morck et al. (1988) find out that for older firms Tobin's q is lower when a founding family holds one of the top management positions than when the firm is run by a professional manager. For a sample of Israeli firms Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) point out that family firms run by their owners perform relatively worse in comparison to family firms managed by professionals. Thus, the subsequent Table splits the data sample into a group of firms where a family member occupied one of the top management positions at the time of the IPO and into a second group where professional managers ran and controlled the firm. The 12-month analysis in Panel A does not show significant differences between the two groups. Mean BHARs for family-managed firms are -0.61%. The other group of firms which are not managed or controlled by family members underperforms by -4.75%, although these firms earn slightly higher unadjusted returns of some 11%. BHARs for both groups do not significantly differ from zero as indicated by 3 tests. More interestingly is the number of firms in both groups: The vast majority of 148 firms is managed and/or controlled by family members. Statistical tests in Panel B do not produce any statistically significant differences between the means, medians and distributions of the two groups of firms.
Differences between the two groups remain insignificant for the 36-and 60-month analysis, although both mean and median BHARs indicate that the group of family-managed firms underperforms less than the smaller, second group. 3 years after the flotations the first group underperforms by a mean -23.47% and a median -27.51%, whereas the second group underperforms by -35.80% and -44.60%, respectively. Again, absolute measures are higher for the second group of family firms. This relations reverses after 60 months: Family-managed orcontrolled firms earned a BHR of 21.05% whereas the other group only earned some 10%. Corresponding medians are both negative with -6.85% and -12.12%, respectively. Market-adjusted returns provide better evidence: The first group underperforms the DAFOX by -48.64%. The second group underperforms by an astounding and also significant -80.10%. Remarkably are the standard deviations of both measures. Ranges amount to some 700%. Although the differences are not statistically significant, their economical extent is.
The empirical findings seem to support Fama and Jensen's (1983) suggestion: It is an important issue who runs and controls the firm. Family members seem to have a positive impact on firm performance supporting the agency view of the firm, predicting that agency conflicts are reduced in those firms. Furthermore, they reject the rent-protection view of the firm, predicting that families try to expropriate minority shareholders. On the other hand, these findings should not be taken as stylized facts as the classification into one of the two groups is based on incomplete information. As noted before, especially in older firms data inavailability problems arise due to the fact that family members could have changed their family names. Other thinkable obstacles are situations where a family acquired another firm which was founded by another family and kept its traditional name.
Long-Run Performance by Type of Shares
Most of the literature argues that dual class share structures are most typical with concentrated ownership driven by families who try to keep their private benefits of control. As a consequence, rational investors should value firms issuing shares using dual class structures and solely non-voting preference stock, respectively, with a discount in comparison to other IPO firms. E.g. Ehrhardt and Nowak (2000a) examining a sample of 105 German family firms point out that the underperformance can only be attributed to the significant underperformance of firms issuing non-voting shares. These 41 firms underperformed significantly by -18.74% whereas the other group of 65 firms issuing ordinary shares overperformed the market by an insignificant 0.71%. Ehrhardt and Nowak argue that although differences in means between these two samples are not statistically significant the economic insight is definite. Table 15 splits the entire sample of 174 firms into two groups: (i) Family firms issuing solely ordinary shares and (ii) firms floating non-voting preference shares or preference shares in conjunction with common stock. As no preference shares were issued in 1997 and 1998 all IPOs in these two years were excluded reducing the sample to 149 firms.
The findings presented in Table 15 are not in line with Nowak and Ehrhardt's (2000a) results. The theoretical argumentation quoted before has to be rejected: 5 years after the issuance ordinary shares perform worse in comparison to the control group of preference shares. Whereas the first group has mean and median BHARs of some -60%, significantly different from zero, the second group underperforms by 'only' -39.67% and -25.24%, respectively. Interestingly, mean BHRs equal, but standard deviations of BHARs do not. Tests regarding differences in means, medians and distributions do not provide statistically significant differences between the two groups. The direction of the results does not change when analyzing 36-month returns. Again, family firms issuing ordinary shares perform worse than family-owned firms that issued preference shares or both types of shares. Contrary to Ehrhardt (1997) who finds a nonsignificant but slightly negative correlation, the results displayed in Table 16 are less definite: The Pearson coefficient documents lightly negative relations during the first 6 months. It turns meaningsless after one year, again negative after 36 months and positive after 60 months. Contrary to that, both rank measures find a statistically significant and positive correlation between initial returns and BHARs during the first 6 months after the flotations. Both measures remain positive but lose their significance. The correlations become significant again after 60 months. In line with Ehrhardt's argumentation the documented patterns do not seem to support the fad hypothesis. Probably, there is no direct or causal relation between the levels of underpricing and long-run abnormal performance. These findings are consistent with those for the capital market in the United States as presented by Ritter and Welch (2002).
Control Sample of Non-Family Initial Public Offerings
The long-run performance of family firm IPOs is compared to a sample of flotations of non-family firms. The control-firm portfolio originally comprises 176 companies. 45 firms are excluded because stock price data was not available. KKMDB provided stock prices for the majority of 112 companies. For the remaining 19 companies stock data was obtained from the Bloomberg Database. As Bloomberg data does not consider dividend payments potential biases could occur. These effects are expected to be minimal as 14 out of the 19 firms went public during the last two years, i.e. in 1997 and 1998. Finally, the long-run control sample of non-family firms contains 131 firms. The distribution of IPO events over time significantly differs between the two samples. Almost half of these firms, i.e. a number of 67 companies, went public during the most recent three years. Consequently, Table 17 compares the long-run performance of family firms versus the returns of nonfamily firms for the 1977 to 1995 period and for 12-, 36-and 60-month holding periods.
The 12-month analysis in Panel A reveals that there are almost no differences between the two groups. All measures, e.g. BHR, wealth relative, mean and median BHAR, fall into a very small range. Both groups perform insignificantly compared to the DAFOX. As noted before, the group of family firms is more than twice as large as the control group of non-family firms. Values for minimum and maximum are slighty larger for the group of firms mentioned first. However, this does not alter the test statistics in Panel A. Besides, Panel B provides strong evidence that there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups.
All tests regarding differences between marketadjusted long-run returns of family firms and nonfamily firms remain insignificant when examining returns for the 36-month holding period. Corresponding results presented in Panel A support these findings. Although both mean and median nonfamily BHRs are about 10% higher in comparison to unadjusted figures for family firm returns, measures for wealth relatives as well as mean BHARs indicate that family firm perform worse. The mean BHAR amounts to -10.50%. Non-family firms underperform by 'only' -4.65%. t-tests as well as the sign test indicate that the underperformance of family firms is weakly significant. Two other facts have to be highlighted: (i) Standard deviations are almost equal with some 72% and (ii) the worst family firm underperforms by -252.18% whereas the worst nonfamily firm obtained a BHAR of only -150.09%. Unfortunately, the evidence with regard to underperforming family firms is weakened by the figures for medians. The median BHAR is 11.95% for the group of family firms whereas nonfamily firms have a median BHAR of -17.81% after 36 months. The underperformance of family-owned firm in comparison to the non-family control sample -at least from an economically point of view -crystallizes when investigating the long-run performance for a holding period of 60 months. Family firms earn a mean 21.63% and a median -4.86% BHR. Contrary to that, the control sample yields 37.45% and 17.31%, respectively. Adjustments by the market unfold the following results of which all differ statistically significant from zero: 143 family firms underperform the DAFOX by -50.13% in terms of means in contrast to -36.98% of the control sample. The standard deviation is higher in case of family firms (123.18% versus 109.31%). The results are confirmed by medians and by wealth relatives. The median family firm BHAR amounts to -39.16% whereas the non-family firm BHAR attained -32.90%. The wealth relative suggests that an investor had to invest 141 units in the IPO firm instead of investing 100 units in the market portfolio to achieve the same wealth after 60 months in case of the average family firm. In case of non-family flotations the investors had to invest some 127 units in the IPO firm instead of 100 units in the benchmark. Values for minimum and maximum confirm the above mentioned findings with regard to the standard deviation. Interestingly, the percentage of firms obtaining negative BHARs equals in both groups and amounts to 70%. To put in a nutshell:
Only 30% of the IPOs in both groups beat the market.
Panel C confirms the above mentioned assumption that it takes 5 years -at least 36 months seem to be insufficient -to reveal the total extent of negative abnormal performance. The results presented in Table 17 provide empirical evidence that familyowned firms do not only underperform the market but, in addition, underperform a portfolio of other companies that went public during the same period. From a statistical point of view the differences between the two groups of issuing firms are not significant, i.e. the null hypothesis cannot be rejected that the differences between the two means and medians, respectively, equal zero.
The long-run performance comparison of familyowned firms versus non-family businesses allows drawing conclusion with regard to at least one former empirical study: Aussenegg (1997) 
Size Hypothesis
Khurshed, Mudambi and Goergen (1999) posit a positive relationship between the size of a firm and its long-run performance. VOL is used as a proxy for size and denotes the natural logarithm of inflationadjusted nominal issuing volume. An additional variable REV is introduced which measures the logarithm of the inflation-adjusted gross revenues of an IPO firm in the year prior to its flotation. Signs of both coefficients are expected to be positive. Contrary to the assumption, the univariate regressions R 1.1 and R 1.2 provide evidence against the size hypothesis. Both regression coefficients are negative and significant. The combination of both proxies in R 1.4 eliminates explanatory power. REV 72 See e.g. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001a) , p. 139-166, for a comprehensive overview on long-run theories and models.
turns positive and both variables turn insignificant. The negative coefficient of NR could be interpreted as a decrease of underperformance over time, i.e. later IPO firms underperform less than earlier IPOs. The inclusion of NR in R 1.5 and R 1.6 slightly changes the coefficients for VOL and REV. REV loses its significance. Values for R 2 's have to be attributed to the variable NR. The size hypothesis has to be rejected. The larger firms are, the worse is their performance. These results could be interpreted with the existence of private benefits in family firms. As Barclay and Holderness (1989) state 'private benefits should increase with firm size because larger firms offer potentially larger pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits.'
Age Hypothesis
The age hypothesis states: The older the IPO firms, the better the long-run performance. Age is used as a proxy for uncertainty. In general, older firms could be associated with less uncertainty due to a longer operating history. Another factor seems to be important when analyzing family firms. The older a family firm is, the larger the family or families get. In most firms, some members hold management positions within the firm whereas a larger group of family members holds equity stakes and longs for annual dividend payments. Managing family members could have incentives to expropriate the other group by skimming private benefits at the expense of firm value. Consequently, outside family members are expected to control their relatives. A positive sign for AGE should be observed. Note: p-values (in italics) correspond to tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to 0. E.g. p-values less than 0.05 indicate statistically significant nonzero coefficients. The R 2 statistic measures the proportion of the variability in the dependent variable. The adjusted R 2 statistic adjusts the standard R 2 value based on the number of coefficients in the model. The F-Ratio is a ratio of the variance explained by a factor to the unexplained variance. In case there is no effect, the associated p-value is close to 1. C denotes regressions where regressions coefficients are corrected by the Huber-White covariance matrix estimator. Table 19 provides evidence against the age hypothesis. The coefficient for AGE is slightly negative and remains insignificant in all regressions. The second variable, CEO, is positive indicating a superior performance in firms where the top management positions are held by family members. In line with Table 14 , all regression coefficients for CEO remain insignificant.
Underwriter Reputation
Hypothesis The underwriter reputation hypothesis states that IPOs underwritten by prestigious underwriters have a better long-run performance. REP measures the aggregate issuing volume of all other IPOs that were leadunderwritten by the specific investment bank, measured as the natural logarithm of the inflationadjusted nominal issuing volume. The variable IPOBNK considers IPO activities as part of the consortium of issuing banks. IPOBNK counts the number of previous IPOs where the lead underwriter under consideration has been part of the syndicate. Positive signs are expected both for REP and IPOBNK.
The univariate regressions R 3.1 and R 3.2 show that the regression coefficients for both REP and IPOBNK are negative and statistically significant. When NR is introduced in regressions R 3.4 and R 3.5, both REP and IPOBNK lose their significance. Thus, the quality of an underwriter cannot be viewed as an indicator for post-IPO performance.
Dilution Hypothesis
Consistent with the ownership retention models discussed in Chapter 3.2, the dilution hypothesis posits that the higher the dilution of the initial owner's shareholding, i.e. the higher the percentage of equity sold, the worse the long-run performance should be. Consequenty, all variables, e.g. FFLOAT, SHRNOM and SHREFF, should have a negative sign. FFLOAT is used as a proxy to measure the percentage of equity issued in the IPO. To control for potential data errors in FFLOAT, SHRNOM and SHREFF are employed as additional variables, denoting the quotient of nominal (effective) issuing volume and the company's share capital directly after the IPO. As part of a wave of IPOs on German stock exchanges, a growing number of family-owned firms have taken the challenge of going public. This paper investigates initial returns and long-run performance of IPOs of 174 family firms floated in Germany between 1977 and 1998. Family businesses typically come closest to the ideal of non-separation of ownership from control, i.e. most of the firms comprised in the data set can be characterized by a high degree of congruence between ownership and management. The fundamental change in ownership structure induced by the flotation represents a change in the governance of the firm as for the first time dispersed outsiders hold equity capital. A detailed examination of the capital market's reactions to these changes in the ownership structure allows drawing conclusions which impact those changes have on firm value. A prediction regarding the long-run stock price performance spans two theories: Advantages of modern corporations where management and ownership are separated are cut short by the principalagent problem. Managers -the agents -could take actions against the interest of shareholders -the principals. Agency problems in closely-held family firms should be less predominant. Utilizing this idea, it could be considered that firms with controlling shareholders -e.g. family firms -should be more valuable. On the other hand, the rent-protection theory predicts that family owners have incentives to siphon off private benefits at the expense of firm performance. It is usually argued that private benefits are comparatively high in civil law countries. Especially non-pecuniary and non-transferable private benefits could have substantial effects on firm value. As the German economy -and especially firms associated with the typical German Mittelstand -are even titled 'the paradise of private benefits' 73 it could be assumed that the negative consequences with regard to the existence of those private benefits should outweigh the positive effects regarding minimized principal-agent conflicts in family firms. Consequently, investors in those firms detecting those expropriation mechanisms should try to sell their stakes. Finally and as a result, family-owned firms where family members enjoy substantial substantial private benefits should be undervalued in comparison to the market.
Several other aspects provide evidence that investment decisions in family-owned firms do not follow the market investment rule. It seems some family firms prefer to survive, in a sense of reducing business risk, in comparison to maximizing shareholder value. Nevertheless, the extent of private benefits and the level of minority shareholder expropriation cannot be determined directly. Thus, long-run returns of IPO firms are used as a proxy as they accrue solely to cash flow claimants. Any persuasive and persistent negative abnormal performance could be interpreted as a deviation from the market investment rule and consequently as a measure for the level of private benefits within in the firm.
Regarding the long-run performance of family firm IPOs it can be concluded that a portfolio of 174 firms yields a positive unadjusted return of 19.29% after 5 years. Positive unadjusted returns turn negative after adjusting by the market movement. 3 years after the listing the market-adjusted return is on average -25.31% compared to a broad index (median: -28.69%). The underperformance increases to -53.50% after 60 months (median: -43.29%). Even when excluding potential new economy and Neuer Markt biases, i.e. analyzing IPOs between 1977 and 1995, the underperformance remains statistically significant different from zero with -10.50% and -50.13%, respectively. A more detailed examination shows that it needed at least the first year after the IPO until significant deviations from the market can be observed. Nevertheless, analyses regarding different market segments, industry sectors and even family ownership fractions as well as family involvement did not produce statistically significant results. Interestingly, firms within the sample managed by family members seem to outperform family firms without that type of family control. Contrary to Ehrhardt and Nowak (2002a) who attribute the underperformance of their set of family firms solely to the underperformance of firms using dual class share structures, the empirical findings in this study are opposed. If the hypothesis proves true that family shareholders use dual class share structures to have a lock on their private benefits in the long run it can be expected that capital markets detect this behaviour and consequently undervalue those firms. Brav and Gompers (1997) underperformance of IPOs can be attributed to investors being systematically over-optimistic about the future prospects of IPO firms. A comparison with non-family firm IPOs shows that the extent of underperformance is higher in case of family firms although statistical tests regarding the differences in means and medians of the two groups are not significant. Nevertheless, it could be asked if the difference can be attributed to potential private benefits in family-owned firms? As for the expectations regarding future IPOs the results presented in this paper indicate that many firms do not achieve the expected lower cost of capital. This can be considered as a sign that German family businesses are only partially suited for the capital market. In any case, an in-depth analysis of a respective IPO candidate should be performed in order to derive a more specific judgement. Having in mind the empirical results presented in this and other studies, investors in family firm IPOs seem to be -at least -'stupid'. In the past, IPO firms in general underperformed the market.
